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New regulations for margin requirements and haircuts are needed
to dampen financial booms and busts.
NO. 135, DECEMBER 2010
FINANCIAL SERVICESThe onset of a global financial crisis gave urgency to being specific about a regulatory
framework that addresses not only the risks affecting individual financial institutions, but the
financial system as a whole.  
Key elements in such a framework are capital and leverage requirements, liquidity requirements,
rules on margins and haircuts when financial instruments are offered as collateral, and loan-
to-value ratios and other mortgage restrictions.
Work on capital and liquidity regulation has been a priority in 2010, but it is time to deal
with other areas before reform momentum is lost. In particular, new regulations are needed
on haircuts and margins, which provide collateral protection that covers credit and market
risks in repo, securities lending and over-the-counter derivatives transactions. 
A market failure in the setting of margin requirements and haircuts led to an exacerbation of
both the financial boom of the past decade and the financial bust, whose aftershocks are felt
today. To deal with these failures, the Committee on the Global Financial System at the Bank
for International Settlements published a report on March 2010, under the chairmanship of
the author of this Backgrounder.
This Backgrounder discusses the Committee’s recommendations, notes how they relate to
market failures and can complement related policies, argues that they should be adopted in
their strongest form internationally, including by Canada, and discusses how to do so. The
recommendations emphasize “through-the-cycle” haircuts and initial margins, the potential
use of add-ons to haircuts and margins by macroprudential authorities, and market practices
that are less procyclical than they were before and during the crisis. 
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The C.D. Howe Institute is a leading independent, economic and social policy research institution. The
Institute promotes sound policies in these fields for all Canadians through its research and
communications. Its nationwide activities include regular policy roundtables and presentations by policy
staff in major regional centres, as well as before parliamentary committees. The Institute’s individual and
corporate members are drawn from business, universities and the professions across the country.
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T
he financial crisis of
2007/09 was related to
poor risk management by
financial institutions with regard
to three financial products: 
US mortgages (especially the
origination and holding of sub-
prime mortgages), securitized
products based on those mortgages
and derivative products based on
those securitized products. The
related credit risk taken on by
many financial institutions was
far greater than they had realized.
In some cases, the amount of capital that
they held was insufficient for that risk.
Uncertainty about the degree of credit risk
taken on by many institutions led to increased
funding liquidity risk for most institutions.
As the financial crisis worsened the
macroeconomic situation, housing price risk
rose in a number of countries; as did collateral
risk for institutions holding mortgages in
those countries. One can tell much of the
story of the financial crisis by focusing on
these risks – housing price/collateral risk,
credit risk and funding liquidity risk – and
the response of banks, central banks and
governments to the crystallization of these
risks.
1 (Table 1 provides definitions of risks.)
While these risks played a large role in the
financial crisis and, therefore, are appropriately
the focus of current international financial
regulatory reforms, other risks also played a
significant part. Indeed, the crystallization
of market liquidity risk – along with the
associated market risk on financial
instruments – was an important factor in the
propagation of the financial crisis. The terms
and conditions for financing securities and
offsetting market risks in over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives markets had eased
significantly in the boom period between
2003 and early 2007, but they worsened
substantially in the latter part of 2007 and
again in 2008.
Haircuts, which provide the extra collateral
protection to cover credit and market risks
in repo transactions, had been squeezed in
the boom period and then rose, dramatically
in some cases, during the crisis. Margin
requirements on OTC derivatives, which
lead to collateral being posted to cover credit
and market risks (both initially and as the
value of the contract changes), had eased in
the boom before tightening in the bust. 
As well, the dynamics of certain requirements
on OTC derivative contracts, such as triggers
related to credit ratings, amplified price
movements.
2 When securities can no longer
be readily financed or hedged, lower market
liquidity results.
3 This procyclical behaviour
in the downturn led to an amplification and
exacerbation of the financial cycle.
Margin Spirals
Several authors, including Brunnermeier and
Pederson (2009), have identified what they
The author would like to thank Steve Ferris, Charles Freedman, Paul Jenkins, former colleagues and several referees for useful comments and
discussions. The author is a former Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada. He chaired the international Study Group of the Committee of
the Global Financial System (CGFS) that, in March 2010, released the CGFS report discussed extensively in this Backgrounder. The views
expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the study group or of the CGFS.
1 A complete discussion of the financial crisis would have to include a number of other factors, including the unregulated shadow banking
system, the heavy reliance on short-term wholesale funding markets and the opaqueness of certain financial products and exposures.
2 Large margin calls can affect market dynamics. See the examples from the financial crisis given in Table 1 of CGFS 2010(a).
3 Financial sector firms have been examining how to improve their risk management practices in this broad area. See, for example, IIF (2008,
2009), ISDA (2010) and ISDA et al. (2010).4 There is a significant body of related research on margin spirals and market makers. Two recent academic studies suggest that the degree to
which financial intermediaries or investors are constrained by the amount of capital they hold matters for the effect on asset prices
(Coughenour and Saad 2004, and Hameed et al. 2009). See also the work of Gârleanu and Pederson (2009) on how changes in haircuts may
affect financial market prices. Adrian and Shin (2008) present a model in which “increased risk reduces the debt capacity as a whole, giving
rise to amplified de-leveraging by institutions through the chain of repo transactions.” For a discussion of the procyclical movements of some
margin requirements in Canada, see Kamhi (2009).
| 2 Backgrounder 135
C.D. Howe Institute
call a “margin spiral.” In this downward
spiral, lower market liquidity leads to greater
market volatility – and thus to higher
margin requirements and larger haircuts – as
well as to market losses on existing positions.
This, in turn, results in funding problems
for banks and other dealers, which leads to
less market making.
4 The downward spiral
continues (Figure 1).
In boom times, there can be an upward
spiral in which higher market liquidity leads
to lower volatility – and thus to easier
margin requirements and lower haircuts, as
well as to market gains on existing positions.
This improves the funding ability of banks
and dealers and results in more market
making, with the upward spiral continuing.
This behaviour of margin requirements
and haircuts is referred to as “procyclical”
because it follows the overall financial cycle:
in other words, there is an easing of margin
and haircut terms and conditions when most
other financial conditions are improving and
a tightening when conditions are worsening.
The CGFS Study and Report
In 2008, the Committee on the Global
Financial System (CGFS), a body of senior
Source: Author.
Risk Definition
Collateral Risk Risk associated with the sustainability of the value of a real or financial
asset pledged as collateral for a loan or other financial products.
Credit Risk Risk of loss due to the non-payment of a loan or a financial product.
Funding Liquidity Risk Risk that a financial institution would not have sufficient funds to
make required payments.
Housing Price Risk Risk of changes in the price of housing.
Market Liquidity Risk Risk that a specific financial instrument cannot be sold or offset
without suffering a loss because of poor market depth.
Market Risk Risk of changes in mark-to-market values associated with portfolios of
financial instruments.
Table 1: Definitions of RisksBackgrounder 135 | 3














Figure 1: Margin Spiral
Source: Adapted from Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009) and presentations by Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney
and Former Deputy Governor David Longworth, the author.
central bank officials from around the globe
that reports to the central bank governors
who meet at the Bank for International
Settlements, undertook a study to better
understand the nature of the procyclicality
in financial systems that arose from leverage
and valuation effects. Their study of this
issue was published in CGFS (2009). Out of
this study, it became apparent that further
examination of the role of margin requirements
and haircuts in procyclicality was necessary.
Another group was established under my
chairmanship to “undertake a fact-finding
study on margining practices, to analyse their
impact on the financial system through the
cycle, and to explore and analyse the desirability
of various alternatives for reducing the
procyclical effect of margining practices on
asset prices.” This study group published its
report in March (CGFS 2010a), henceforth
referred to as the CGFS report.
5
This Backgrounder discusses the CGFS
report’s recommendations, notes how they
relate to market failures and can complement
related policies, argues that they should be
adopted in their strongest form internationally,
including by Canada, and discusses how this
might be achieved. The recommendations
feature proposed regulations that emphasize
through-the-cycle haircuts and initial
margins, the potential use of add-ons to
haircuts and margins by macroprudential
authorities and market practices that are less
procyclical than some that were employed
before and during the crisis. The social
benefits of these recommendations in terms
of reducing the excessive procyclicality of
the financial system and the costs of any
future financial crises are seen as exceeding
the recommendations’ social costs, which
will largely be borne by the users of
financial products.
5 The CGFS report was focussed primarily on fixed income markets, as opposed to equity markets, partly because of their greater importance
in the recent crisis and in the behaviour of banks.6 The financial system will always be procyclical. What is important is dealing with the effects of excessive procyclicality on systemic risk.
7 There is significant overlap between macroprudential instruments in this list and the one in Recommendation 3 of G20 Working Group 1
(2009), which included the following: measures of leverage incorporating off-balance sheet exposures; capital requirements (moving over the
cycle); loan-loss provisioning standards (which could use available credit information); margin requirements (using longer historical samples)
and loan-to-value ratios for mortgages.
8 That being said, there is a clear case for examining the use of countercyclical mortgage restrictions, such as loan-to-value ratios. As well,
banking supervisors could use Basel Pillar 2 to tighten leverage ratios or liquidity requirements during a boom.
9 Dreff (2010) discusses how securities lending improves financial market liquidity.
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How Policies on Margins and Haircuts Fit
into Other Macroprudential Concerns
The behaviour of margin requirements and
haircuts is only one source of financial
system procyclicality. Measures that focus on
reducing the systemic risk arising from the
procyclicality of the financial system as a
whole can be regarded as “macroprudential
instruments.”
6 The macroprudential
approach to policy originated at the Bank
for International Settlements with the idea
of looking “beyond the risk position of
individual institutions to risks affecting the
system as a whole (Turner 2010).”
The financial crisis has given some
urgency to being more specific about what
constitutes a good macroprudential
framework and what the main macroprudential
instruments should be (CGFS 2010b). Some
lists of potential macroprudential instruments
are very long, but given the main risks in
financial systems and the procyclical
behaviour of the associated cycles, the key
instruments can be placed in the groupings
shown in Table 2: capital and leverage
requirements; liquidity requirements; margin
and haircut requirements; and loan-to-value
ratio and other mortgage restrictions.
7
Macroprudential instruments are effective
when kept constant at a sufficiently tight
level and/or are varied countercyclically.
Thus far, the only clear international
proposals for the countercyclical use of
macroprudential instruments are for
countercyclical capital requirements
developed by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (Basel 2010b) and
those in the CGFS report.
8
Market Structure and Definitions
There are three markets where securities
financing or margining for derivatives are
important. Two of these apply to securities
financing transactions. The first of these
markets is for repo transactions, in which a
firm selling securities agrees to buy them
back at a specified price and time. In the
contract governing such a transaction, a
haircut is specified that determines the
overcollateralization of the transaction,
which protects the seller against a large part
of the market risk in the event that its
counterparty fails. 
The second securities financing market is
for securities lending transactions.
9 In the
lending of securities, the borrower provides
the lender with collateral in the form of high
quality collateral securities or cash. The
lender receives a fee, quoted as an annual percentage.
The final market where margin practices
are important is for OTC derivatives
transactions. Here, the contract determines
any initial margin to be paid, as well as the
variation margin that covers changes in the
value of the contract as they occur.
A Market Failure
A market failure exists in the form of a
negative externality associated with the
setting of haircuts and initial margin terms;
because the setting of these terms is
procyclical, what appears to be reasonable
behaviour by each individual market
participant actually increases systemic risk.Backgrounder 135 | 5
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This behaviour thus raises the probability of
a downward spiral in liquidity, financial
asset prices and the provision of financial
services, possibly exacerbating a financial crisis.
For example, firms estimating the size of
“supervisory haircuts”
10 (using models
approved by their regulators) for the purposes of
calculating capital requirements fail to take
into account the negative externality that
arises from setting them too low. As a result,
there can be a sharp contraction in the supply
of secured financing by banks and broker-
dealers to the economy as a whole when
assessments about the quality of pledged
collateral change abruptly. Such a miscalculation
increases the probability of a financial
system spiral, as described above. 
To remediate this, new regulatory policies
should be adopted in this area that provide
net social benefits by dealing with such
negative externalities, taking into account
the social costs of the regulations. 
Proposed Policies to Deal with
Market Failures
The CGFS study makes three types of
recommendations to mitigate market failure.
The first type, which includes two
recommendations, deals directly with
procyclicality arising from major cycles in
haircuts and initial margins.
11 The second
type, which includes three recommendations,
covers unhelpful market practices that are,
or have the potential to be, procyclical. 
The third type, which is self-explanatory and
not elaborated on here, is a single
recommendation that “macroprudential
authorities consider the value of regularly
conducting and disseminating a
predominantly qualitative survey of credit
terms used in these markets.”
Source: Author.
Table 2: Financial Cycles, Financial Risks, and Corresponding Macroprudential Instruments
Cycle Risk Macroprudential 
Instrument
Credit Cycle Credit Risk Capital Requirements
Leverage Requirements
Liquidity Cycle Liquidity Risk Liquidity Requirements
Financial Asset Price Cycle Market Risk
Collateral Risk Margin & Haircut Requirements
Property Price Cycle Collateral Risk Loan-to-value Restrictions
(& other mortgage restrictions)
10 Supervisory haircuts are discussed in more detail below in the section on “Dealing Directly with Procyclicality.”
11 Recent models that would suggest a role for the regulation of haircuts include Geanakoplos (2010), Stein (2010) and Valderrama (2010).| 6 Backgrounder 135
Dealing Directly with Procyclicality 
In my view, the CGFS report’s major
recommendations dealing with mitigating
market failure are proposed measures that
would encourage minimum through-the-
cycle haircuts and initial margin requirements,
with the possibility of counter-cyclical add-
ons in boom times.
12 These measures would
be achieved by adjusting the current Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision process
for calculating capital requirements on
exposures, which would be applied both to
banks and broker-dealers,
13 as well as by
setting regulations for central counterparties
(CCPs) for repos, securities lending and
OTC derivative transactions. It is important
to note that only the minimum level of
haircuts and initial margin requirements
would be regulated. All institutions would
be free to exceed the minimum when they
feel it is insufficient to cover their risks.
Under current Basel regulations, a
“supervisory haircut” must be set for every
transaction secured by eligible collateral.
(The supervisory haircut may be calculated
using a model approved by the supervisor or
may be taken from a list of standard
regulatory haircuts.) The required capital is
calculated based on any positive difference
between the supervisory haircut and the
haircut actually charged, as well as on the
risk rating of the counterparty.
Under the CGFS report recommendation,
regulated financial institutions calculating
supervisory haircuts would not be allowed to
use the modelling procedures that in boom
times led to lower supervisory haircuts, and
standard regulatory haircuts would be
calculated on a through-the-cycle basis. In
practice, this would mean the use of price
volatility “over a long historical period that
includes stressed market conditions.”
14
Moreover, during boom periods,
macroprudential authorities would have the
discretion to use add-ons to supervisory
haircuts for all financial instruments or just
for particular ones.
15 Because of the through-
the-cycle approach for minimum haircuts
and initial margins, leverage would not rise
as much during booms when risk is taken on
– indeed leverage could fall if add-ons were
used – and would not fall as much during
busts because it would be starting from a
lower level.
16 17 Because there would be
higher margin requirements and haircuts in
good times, regulators would have to decide
how high the minimums should be in order
to get the best cost-benefit trade-off.
Regulators will also have to be careful to
C.D. Howe Institute
12 Bank of England (2009, p.19) notes that “Time-varying margins or haircuts on certain secured financial transactions could be levied on
secured lending to other parts of the financial system – for example, ‘shadow’ banks or hedge funds. This would allow the authorities to
influence the marginal cost of lending to non-bank financial companies if conditions became overly exuberant.  As such, they might be a
means of averting an imprudent increase in the leverage of non-banks.”
13 These regulations should be applied to Canadian investment dealers on all their capital market activities.
14 Exact details of what this means would need to be worked out by regulatory authorities. The spirit of the recommendation would be to use a
high percentile of the distribution of all x-day volatilities (for a specific x between 10 and 90) that can be calculated over a very long
historical period (greater than 10 years, if possible).
15 Allowing supervisory haircuts to fall in crisis times would have no effect because financial institutions would not lower haircuts or margin
requirements when they perceived risk to be high or rising.  In fact, they would likely raise them in such circumstances, and they and CCPs
should not be prevented from doing so.
16 Some commentators have criticized potential macroprudential policies because of a need to identify where the financial system is in the
cycle. Calculations of through-the-cycle haircuts, however, rely only on historical data. Similarly, benchmarks for the use of counter-cyclical
add-ons could be based entirely on the behaviour of financial variables (such as spreads of interest rates over government yields or volumes of
secured financing) relative to historical norms. If there were good reason to believe that the future would be significantly different from the
past, then some adjustment should be made to calculations of haircuts or benchmarks based on historical data. However, one needs to guard
against too easily believing that “this time is different.”
17 There appears to be no practical way to regulate an eventual overall fall in leverage during busts (but see footnote 19 below on a related area
for CCPs). That being said, the build-up in risk (which is often not well understood) occurs in booms.Backgrounder 135 | 7
guard against the circumvention of the
minimums, an important area for
macroprudential surveillance.
Central counterparties that are properly
risk-proofed can mitigate counterparty risk
concerns for clearing standardized OTC
derivatives, repos and securities lending
transactions. They, too, should be regulated
in such a way as to minimize the procyclicality
of their margining and haircutting practices. 
In particular, regulators should consider
the imposition of minimum constant
through-the-cycle initial margins and
haircuts, as well as the possible use of
counter-cyclical add-ons.
18 19 (To get the
maximum benefit, there should be a
consistent international approach.) The
current G20 desire to clear standardized
OTC derivatives on CCPs means that this is
the appropriate time to implement this
recommendation.
Taken together, the two major recommendations
in this area deal most directly with the
negative externalities related to the
procyclical setting of initial margin
requirements and haircuts. Table 3 makes
clear which markets would be affected by
these recommendations.
Dealing with Unhelpful Market Practices
As noted above, the CGFS report makes
three other recommendations to deal with
potentially procyclical market practices.
The first deals with encouraging margin
calls to be made in an accurate and timely
fashion both in boom and crisis periods.
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
18 It will be important to preserve the business case for CCPs. In particular, in order not to discourage the use of CCPs, minimum margins and
haircuts at CCPs should not be higher than those set for regulated financial institutions. In addition, central banks should set their haircuts
at or above the regulated minimums so as not to encourage the use of their facilities in preference to private markets.
19 Although only minimum haircuts and initial margins would be regulated under the recommendation, some close to the industry have raised
the question as to whether the rate of increase of haircuts and initial margins charged by CCPs in systemically important markets should be
regulated as well.  This would help avoid sudden reductions in leverage with its attendant amplification effects on prices.  However, it would
have to be balanced against the potential extra risk assumed by the CCP. More work is required in this area.
Table 3: Two Major Recommendations in CGFS Report and Markets to Which They Apply




Set capital requirements on securities
financing transactions that are 
relatively stable through the cycle, 
with countercyclical add-on. 
Promote central counterparties;
minimum constant through-the-cycle
margins and haircuts for CCPs;
countercyclical add-on.
Source: Author from CGFS 2010 (a).| 8 Backgrounder 135
Such discipline would help to dampen
procyclical dynamics. In particular, it could
reduce the need to seize and auction collateral or
to close out contracts. Therefore, the report
recommends that regulators should require
every dealer to institute policies that
explicitly link haircuts and collateral
requirements to the strength (capacity and
timeliness) of the dealer’s process for valuing
a particular type of collateral, counterparty
or contract.
The second recommendation deals with
OTC derivative contracts that often include
“credit triggers” requiring more collateral
from counterparties when they are
downgraded by credit rating agencies. It
would appear that market participants
typically fail to take account of the negative
externalities that come from the use of
similar triggers by other market participants,
a situation that can lead to a counterparty
defaulting because it cannot meet
simultaneous large margin calls. The report
therefore recommends measures that:
￿ Discourage such terms that may generate
large discrete margin calls;
￿ Encourage frequent variation margin payments;
￿ Disallow the use of credit triggers as a factor
that would decrease capital charges by
decreasing the estimated exposure at default;
20 and
￿ Require liquidity risk management systems
that take appropriate account of how credit
triggers faced by an institution would affect
that institution’s liquidity.
The final recommendation in this group
addresses the situation, as occurred during
the economic crisis, when some beneficial
owners of securities – that is, those who
effectively owned them even if they were
registered in the name of another institution
– withdrew rapidly from securities lending
programs. This was because they lacked
sufficient knowledge of the terms and risks
of their programs and did not know how to
reasonably change those terms to protect
their interests. 
The CGFS report, therefore, recommends
that best practice guidelines be developed
for negotiating terms for securities lending.
It also recommends disclosing risks underlying 
the reinvestment activities of custodian
banks administering such programs. At
times of financial turbulence, this would
lead to a smaller reduction in the supply of
lendable assets, as well as in the liquidity of
the repo market in which cash collateral is
often invested.
The particular markets to which these three
recommendations apply are shown in Table 4.
How The CGFS Recommendations
Would Complement Other Policies
Policies dealing with margin requirements
and haircuts are only one set of strategies
that can deal with procyclicality in financial
markets overall and, in particular, with a
procyclical margin cycle. Indeed, the Bank
of Canada believes the regulation of margin
requirements and haircuts is just one of five
ways to dampen the margin cycle and lead to
continuously open financial markets for core
funding (see Carney 2008 and Fontaine et
al. 2009). The others are:
￿ Standardization of securitization, which would
lead to a more active securitization market that is
less prone to drying up in a crisis (see Hendry et
al. 2010, and Selody and Woodman 2009);
C.D. Howe Institute
20 This is consistent with the G20’s call to reduce the extent to which credit ratings are hardwired into regulations.Backgrounder 135 | 9
￿ The use of appropriately risk-proofed central
counterparties
21 for repo – such as the new
platform currently being constructed by the
Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation
(Investment Industry Association of Canada 2009)
– and for clearing standardized derivative
instruments, as agreed to by G20 leaders in 2009
(see G20 2009);
￿ Higher liquidity requirements in normal times for
banks, as recently approved by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel
2010a);
22 and
￿ Appropriate central bank liquidity provisions that
take into account the avoidance of moral hazard
(see Longworth 2010, and Selody and Wilkins 2010).
By dealing with the various sources of
procyclicality along the margin spiral (see
Figure 2), these policies together should lead
to significantly dampened cycles in financial
markets when compared to the 2007/09 period.
How Can These Recommendations
be Implemented?
All the CGFS report recommendations are
still that – recommendations. The report was
sent to the international Financial Stability
Board (FSB), which will consider it as part
of its procyclicality agenda. Clearly, the
work on the regulation of capital and
liquidity was a higher priority in 2010, and
appropriately so. But it is now time to move
on to other areas of re-regulation that need
to be dealt with before reform momentum is
lost and it becomes extremely difficult to
achieve further international agreements.
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
21 Central counterparties must be appropriately risk-proofed or the whole financial system can become endangered. The Committee on
Payments and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions have done considerable work on
appropriate standards. See, for example, CPSS (2010), a consultative report on the application of earlier recommendations on CCPs to CCPs
for OTC derivatives.
22 Northcott and Zelmer (2009) note that there are important macroprudential issues in the establishment of appropriate liquidity requirements.
Table 4: Three Complementary Recommendations in CGFS Report and Markets to Which They Apply




Link credit terms that can be
applied to dealer's capacity to
mark to market. 
Discourage and dampen effects 
of credit triggers. 
Develop best practice guidelines. 
Source: Author from CGFS 2010 (a).International Implementation
Key to global implementation is that the
recommendations be seen as a coherent
package aimed at achieving a system-wide or
macroprudential objective. Various
recommendations would, at least at first
glance, appear to fall under various
international standards setters such as the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
the International Organization of Securities
Commissions for securities dealers and
markets or domestic macroprudential
authorities for the levels and countercyclical
add-ons related to supervisory haircuts and
associated capital. 
Therefore, it is important that the FSB
adopt the recommendations in principle and
ask how standards setters and domestic
authorities would apply them. Working out
the details by standard setters should include
studying the interactions with other existing
or proposed regulations.
As currently worded, some of the
recommendations appear somewhat weak
(“recommend for consideration” or “consider”).
Given the evident market failure in this area,
it is incumbent upon those who do not want
to implement the recommendations to show
why they would not be in the best interest of
the world financial system or, in other
words, why the costs would exceed the
evident benefits. 
Domestic Implementation
In the near term, Canadian authorities
should encourage the FSB to adopt the
recommendations in principle in the near
future, before they are sent to standard
setting bodies and domestic authorities. 
If there were to be no such international
agreement in the next year or two, the fall-
back position for Canada would be to
attempt to obtain agreement that where the
domestic currency authorities (i.e., Canadian
authorities for Canadian dollar instruments)
have set certain regulations, FSB member
countries (including the European Union)
would enforce those regulations on their
banks and dealers internationally for































Figure 2: How Recommendations on Margin Practices and Haircuts Would Complement 
Other Policies for Continuously Open Markets
Source: Adapted from presentations by Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney and Former Deputy Governor David Longworth, the author.Backgrounder 135 | 11
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23 This has some similarities with the reciprocity provisions of the 2010 countercyclical capital buffer proposal of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision.
24 Regulators will need to ensure that the balance of all the regulations relating to the new repo CCP does not discourage its use relative to
similar transactions that currently clear through FINet, the fixed income netting service of Clearing and Depository Services.
transactions in financial instruments
denominated in that currency.
23This would
enable all the recommendations to be
implemented domestically and enforced
internationally for Canadian-dollar-
denominated instruments. 
Failing a full international accord, such an
approach could be particularly important for
the application in Canada and other
countries of the two major procyclicality
recommendations dealing with through-the-
cycle haircuts and margin requirements and
possible countercyclical add-ons.
If there were no international agreement –
even by currency – in the next couple of
years, some of the recommendations could
and should be implemented domestically.
These should include the following parts of
the recommendations regarding central
counterparties:
￿ The promotion of such institutions;
￿ The mandating of minimum constant through-
the-cycle margins for the new repo CCP
(CDCC);
24
￿ The consideration by domestic authorities of
whether there are situations, such as a boom, when
they would want to increase the margins on the
new repo CCP; and 
￿ The possible regulation for macroprudential
reasons of domestic CCP margin requirements for
the clearing of OTC derivatives if the important
foreign CCPs were regulated in a similar fashion.
(Otherwise, the competitive position of domestic
CCPs vis-à-vis foreign CCPs would be
significantly eroded).
The recommendation on linking credit
terms that can be applied to a dealer’s
capacity to mark to market should also be
implemented domestically, in part because
there are good microprudential and
institutional risk management reasons to do
so in addition to macroprudential ones.
Meanwhile, best practice at financial
institutions with respect to the use of credit
triggers and related items is moving broadly
in the directions suggested by the report. To
encourage such practices and to remove a
capital incentive to use credit triggers,
Canada should adopt the recommendation
to discourage and dampen the effects of
credit triggers, even though it will not have
its full effect without international agreement.
Finally, best practice guidelines for
securities lending would likely be domestic
in any event, and domestic guidelines would
have their greatest effect on Canadian-
dollar-denominated instruments. Therefore,
they should be developed for Canada,
regardless of an international accord. 
With respect to the three last
recommendations above, cross-border issues
do not appear to raise any significant cost of
domestic implementation when the same
recommendations are not adopted abroad.
Broad agreement among the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions, the
Bank of Canada and the Department of
Finance would allow most of these
recommendations to be adopted
domestically. Those recommendations that
affect securities dealers and CCPs would also
likely require the approval of provincial
securities commissions. 
Conclusion
A market failure in the setting of margin
requirements and haircuts led to an
exacerbation of both the financial boom of
the past decade and the financial bust of| 12 Backgrounder 135
2007/09, whose aftershocks are still being
felt today. If implemented, the CGFS report
recommendations would mitigate this type
of market failure and lead to less
procyclicality in financial markets. In
particular, it is important to set supervisory
haircuts in the calculation of capital
requirements to encourage higher minimum
through-the-cycle haircuts and to grant
macroprudential authorities the powers to
raise those supervisory haircuts when booms
become too strong.
These CGFS recommendations should be
adopted internationally by the FSB and
incorporated into international standards.
This will maximize their net benefits.
However, in the absence of such an
international agreement, requiring the
worldwide implementation of requirements
set by domestic authorities in instruments
denominated in their own currency  would
be more effective that mere domestic
regulation. Even in the absence of any type
of international agreement in the next few
years, Canada could usefully adopt many of
the recommendations.
The CGFS recommendations are
complementary to other policy initiatives
that are being adopted in Canada and
elsewhere to dampen the procyclicality in
financial markets and thus reduce the
probability of future financial crises.
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Annex: Recommendations from
CGFS report (CGFS 2010a, pp. viii-ix)
The CGFS report recommends a series of
options, including some for consideration,
directed at margining practices to dampen
the build-up of leverage in good times and
soften the systemic impact of the subsequent
deleveraging. These options largely
complement one another.
Recommended
￿ To reduce the impact on financial markets of not
promptly recognizing declines in the value of
collateral or derivative positions, link the credit
terms that can be applied to securities financing
transactions (SFTs) and OTC derivatives contracts
to: (i) the dealers' capacity to mark to market the
collateral posted (in the case of SFTs) and the
contracts themselves (in the case of OTC
derivatives); and (ii) the frequency with which this
is done.
￿ To minimize the risk of breaches of credit triggers
used in agreements governing OTC derivatives
trades adversely affecting financial market
conditions: (i) discourage the use of contractual
terms that may generate large, discrete margin calls
on counterparties and require that market
participants, irrespective of their credit rating, be
subject to frequent variation margin payments,
ideally on a daily basis, when the mark to market
losses on derivatives trades exceed moderate
threshold amounts; (ii) for all regulated market
participants, disallow the use of credit triggers as a
factor decreasing the estimated exposure at default
for determining regulatory capital charges; and
(iii) require regulated market participants to have
liquidity risk management systems that take
appropriate account of various credit trigger-
related liquidity shocks.
￿ To improve the stability of the supply of secured
financing through the securities lending program,
develop best practice guidelines for negotiating
terms for securities lending and require custodian
banks administering such programs to provide
improved disclosure of the risks underlying their
reinvestment activities.
￿ To allow macroprudential authorities to assess
financing conditions in secured lending and OTC
derivatives markets, consider the value of regularly
conducting and disseminating a predominantly
qualitative survey of credit terms used in these
markets, including haircuts, initial margins,
eligible pools of collateral assets, maturities and
other terms of financing.
Recommended for Consideration
￿ To reduce financial system procyclicality resulting
from changes in the supply of secured financing
driven by market practices for setting haircuts in
SFTs: (i) set capital requirements on securities
financing for banks and broker-dealers on the basis
of considerations that under normal circumstances
are relatively stable through the cycle; and (ii)
consider the prudential impacts and practical
implications of imposing a countercyclical add-on
which can be used by macroprudential authorities
to make discretionary changes to capital
requirements on secured lending.
￿ To reduce financial system procyclicality arising
from margining practices in secured lending and
derivatives transactions, regulators and authorities
should: (i) promote the use of properly risk-
proofed central counterparties (CCPs) that
mitigate counterparty risk concerns for clearing
standardized derivative instruments and seriously
consider the use of such counterparties – among
other options – for SFTs; (ii) encourage
supervisors and other relevant authorities to review
the policies and risk management practices of
central counterparties for possible procyclical
impacts related to haircuts and margins; and (iii)
consider the prudential impacts and practical
implications of imposing, through such CCPs,
minimum constant through-the-cycle margins and
haircuts, with a possible countercyclical add-on.
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